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1PSEUDORANDOM PROCESSES: ENTROPY AND AUTOMATA
Pen¶ elope Hern¶ andez and Amparo Urbano
A B S T R A C T
This paper studies implementation of cooperative payo®s in ¯nitely repeated games when
players implement their strategies by ¯nite automata of big sizes. Speci¯cally, we analyze how
much we have to depart from fully rational behavior to achieve the Folk Theorem payo®s, i.e.,
which are the maximum bounds on automata complexity which yield cooperative behavior in
long but not in¯nite interactions. To this end we present anew approach to the implementation
of the mixed strategy equilibrium paths leading to cooperation. The novelty is to o®er a new
construction of the set of the pure strategies which belong to the mixed strategy equilibrium.
Thus, we consider the subset of strategies which is characterized by both the complexity of
the ¯nite automata and the entropy associated to the underlying coordination process. The
equilibrium play consists of both a communication phase and the play of a cycle which depends
on the chosen message. The communication set is designed by tools of Information Theory.
Moreover, the characterization of this set is given by the complexity of the weaker player that
implements the equilibrium play. We o®er a domain of de¯nition of the smallest automaton
which includes previous domains in the literature.
KEYWORDS: Complexity; Cooperation; Entropy; Automata; Repeated Games.
21 INTRODUCTION
The message of the Folk Theorem and several other results (Aumann,1960, 1981; Rubinstein,
1979, 1980) is that cooperative behavior may emerge in non-cooperative situations when the
nature of interactions is long term. However, in the ¯nite repetition of most of these situations,
all equilibria lead to the non-cooperative outcome of each stage. This is in clear contrast,
for instance, with common observations in the experiments involving ¯nite repetitions of the
prisoner's dilemma, where participants achieve some mode of cooperation. On the other hand,
if players are restricted to choose automata that are too small to count the number of stages
of the repeated game then both players choosing "a cooperating automata" is a Nash equilib-
rium. One may therefore think of "bounded rationality" or bounded ability to handle strategic
complexities, as a way to solve the prisoners's dilemma paradox. It is surprising that even if
the players can choose large automata, then they can get arbitrarily close to the cooperative
payo®s provided that they are allowed to randomize in their choices of automata (Neyman,
1985).
A great deal ofattentionhas been paidrecently torepeatedgames withboundedcomplexity.
Speci¯cally, thereare several papersintherepeatedgamesliterature, which study theconditions
under which the set of feasible and rational payo®s are equilibrium outcomes, when there are
bounds (possibly very large) to the number of strategies that players may use. In the context
of strategies implemented by ¯nite automata, these bounds are given by the complexity of
the players's automata which implement the equilibrium ( see Rubinstein, 1986; Abreu and
Rubinstein, 1988; Neyman, 1998; Papadimitriou and Yannakakis, 1994; Neyman and Okada,
1997, among others).
The present paper studies implementation of cooperative payo®s in ¯nitely repeated games
when players implement their strategies by ¯nite automata whose sizes are exogenously given;
the motivation being to justify theempirical regularity ofsucha cooperative behavior (Axelrod,
1980). Speci¯cally, we analyze how much we have to depart from fully rational behavior to
achieve the Folk Theorempayo®s, i.e., which are the maximum bounds onautomatacomplexity
which yield cooperative behavior in long but not in¯nite interactions.
Building on the work of Neyman (1998), we improve existing results in the literature (Ney-
man, 1998; Neyman and Okada, 1997, Zemel, 1989 and Papadimitriou and Yannakakis, 1994)
by taking a di®erent approach and focusing on the complexity of mixed strategy equilibrium
paths leading to the Folk Theorem payo®s. Given that in our setting players not only choose
3large automata but also randomize among them, the equilibrium is a mixture of such choices.
Each player's pure strategy determines a possible play and the set of pure strategies which
belong to the support of the mixed strategy determines the set of possible plays. Thus, the
¯rst problem to solve is to choose the subset of a player's pure strategies which generates the
mixed strategy and, in turn, the set of possible plays. There are many of these subsets since
the number of ¯nite automata is an exponential number of a player's complexity. Then, the
secondproblem is to select a right subset such that the selection of the speci¯c equilibrium play
satis¯es good properties of complexity and e±ciency. This implementation of a speci¯c mixed
strategy equilibrium is through a coordination process which yields a payo® close enough to
any of the ones belonging to the set of feasible and rational payo®s. Thus, the complexity of
such a process determines that of the equilibrium path and we look for processes with satisfy
both the equilibrium complexity bounds and maximal e±ciency (closer to the targeted payo®).
We characterize the above properties of a coordination scheme by its informational features.
Speci¯cally, the complexityof the process is related withthe associated entropy, which captures,
fromanInformationTheory viewpoint, thecardinality ofthesequences belongingtoa particular
set with some good properties (Typical Set). The number of equilibrium plays depends on the
cardinality of the selected sequences and thus on its associated complexity. Processes with low
entropy translates to small cardinalities andhenceto small number ofplays while processes with
the maximal entropy imply a large number of sequences andthen a large number of equilibrium
plays. On the other hand, e±ciency of the process is translated to optimal codi¯cation schemes
which produces "short" coordination processes.
Speci¯cally, to construct an equilibrium play the coordination process consists of both a
communication phase and the play of a cycle, whose last part, the veri¯cation play, depends
on the speci¯c chosen message. Since equilibrium plays are in a one-to-one relationship with
the set of communication messages, the design of this set (with respect to the cycle's play) is
crucial for the construction. Then our equilibrium conditions are determined by the inter-play
communication scheme. We consider the subset of pure strategies which is characterized by
both the complexity of the ¯nite automata and the entropy associated to the communication
and the veri¯cation phenomena.
The novelty of the paper is to present a new approachto construct mixedstrategy equilibria
with ¯nite automata. This new viewpoint allows us to characterize the set of pure strategies
which belong to the support of the equilibrium mixed strategies. Moreover since we o®er
the less restrictive equilibrium conditions this set cannot be improved upon. The previous
4literature (Neyman, 1998; Neyman and Okada, 1997) give restrictions on the whole set of pure
strategies. In our approach the restrictions are given oneach pure strategy and thus we are able
to characterize each equilibrium automaton. To impose such constraints we make use of the
notion of entropy as a measure of the messages' uncertainty of our communication scheme and
also as a way to measure their associated complexity. This construction also allows us to relate
our communication scheme under strategic complexity (¯nite automata) with those in repeated
games with communication and unbounded rationality (Lehrer, 1996; Lehrer and Sorin, 1997;
Forges, 1990; Gossner, 1998; Gossner and Viellie, 1999 and Ben-Porath, 1998 among others).
A related line of research addresses the same question under speci¯c restrictions of the
players' set of strategies by an exogenous bound: one of the player's strategies are restricted
to those that have strategic entropy less than a prespeci¯ed bound; where a player's strategic
entropy refers to the uncertainty of his mixed strategy relative to the other player's strategy
(see, Neyman and Okada, 1999 and 2000).
Since punishments in the ¯nitely repeated game are in pure strategies, the main result
of the paper is given in terms of the weaker player's complexity. The domain of de¯nition
of this player's complexity includes all the others bounds already o®ered in the literature.
This improvement is achieved by the approach that we follow: to understand the problem of
constructing the set of pure strategies as a codi¯cation problem where what is being codi¯ed
is the complexity of the player with the smallest automaton (the "weaker player").
Although we use the concept of entropy as a technical tool, it also gives us a much deeper
understanding of the connection between communication and codi¯cation issues. The com-
plexity costs associated to the veri¯cation play are measured in terms of the weaker player's
complexity, since his automaton's capacity determines the number of plays. Moreover, since,
this player's complexity bounds are related to the "-approximation to the targeted equilibrium,
there are also e±ciency costs associated to the veri¯cation play. However, the communication
costs are just measured in terms of the players' payo®s (in the "-approximation to the targeted
equilibrium) since in our construction the weaker player's automaton need not additional states
to process the information. In this framework, the entropy notion is useful to characterize both
the complexity and the e±ciency costs associated to the veri¯cation play and the communica-
tion phase. On one hand, the entropy of sequences of i.i.d. random variables give us a good
measure of the complexity of such sequences. On the other, the optimal (shortest) codi¯cation
of the veri¯cation sequences produces the shortest communication phase, which, in turn, is
bounded by the entropy of the random variable associated to the veri¯cation sequences. Thus,
5the entropy measures both the complexity and the e±ciency costs associated to the equilibrium
play.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the one-shot game, the ¯nitely repeated
game and the ¯nite automata framework and some known results in play complexity are stated.
Section 3 o®ers the main result, while section 4 presents the scheme of the play. The analysis of
sequences and codi¯cation schemes is undertaken in section 5, where some tools of Information
Theory are presented and a ¯rst result of our construction, stated in section 3, is proven.
Section 6 is devoted to prove the main result. To this end, the constructions of (a) the set of
messages, (b) the equilibrium play, and (c) the players' automata, are o®ered and it is checked
that they satisfy the equilibrium conditions. Concluding remarks close the paper.
2 PRELIMINARIES
2.1 The one-shot game
Let G=(f1;2g;(Ai)i2f1;2g;(ri)i2f1;2g) be a game where f1;2g is the set of player. Ai is a ¯nite
set of actions for player i (or pure strategies of player i) and ri : A = A1 £ A2 ¡! R is the
payo® function of player i.
We denote by ui(G) the individual rational payo® of player i in pure strategies, i.e., ui(G) =
min max ri(ai;a¡i) where the max ranges over all pure strategies ofplayeri, andtheminranges
over all purestrategiesofplayer 3¡i. For any¯nitesetB wedenotewedenote by ¢(B)theset of
all probability distributions on B. An equilibrium of G is a pair ¾ = (¾1;¾2) 2 ¢(A1)£¢(A2)
such that for every i and any strategy of player i, ¿i 2 Ai; ri(¿i;¾¡i) ￿ ri(¾1;¾2); where
r(¾) = E¾( r(ai;a¡i)) If ¾ is an equilibrium, the vector payo® r(¾) is called an equilibrium
payo®.
We denote by E(G) the set of all equilibrium payo®s of G.
2.2 The ¯nitely repeated game GT
>From G we de¯ne a new game in strategic form GT which models a sequence of T plays of
G, called stages. By choosing actions at stage t, players are informed of actions chosen in
previous stages of the game. Formally, let Ht;t = 1;:::;T, be the Cartesian product of A by
itself t¡1 times, i.e.: Ht = At¡1, with the common set theoretic identi¯cation A0 = ®, and let
H = [t¸0Ht. A pure strategy ¾i for player i in GT is a mapping from H to Ai;¾i : H ! Ai.
6Obviously, H is a disjoint union of Ht; t = 1;:::;T and ¾i
t:Ht ! Ai as the restriction of ¾i
to Ht. We denote the set of all pure strategies of player i in GT by §i(T). Any 2-tuple
¾ = (¾1;¾2) 2 £§i(T) of pure strategies induces a play !(¾) = (!1(¾);:::;!T(¾)) with
!t(¾) = (!1
t(¾);!2
t(¾)) de¯ned by !1(¾) = (¾1(®);¾2(®)) = ¾(®) and by the inductionrelation
!i




T be the average vector payo® during the ¯rst T stages induced
by the strategy pro¯le ¾:
Two strategies ¾i and ¿i of player i in GT are called equivalent if for every 3¡ fig tuple of
pure strategies ¾¡i;!t(¾i;¾¡i) = !t(¿i;¾¡i) for every 1 ￿ t ￿ T.
An equivalence class of pure strategies is called a reduced strategy.
2.3 Finitely repeated games played by ¯nite automata
A ¯nite automaton for player i that implements the strategy pro¯le ¾ in GT is a tuple Mi =<
Qi;qi
0;fi;gi >, where:
² Qi is the set of states
² qi
0 is the initial state
² fi is the action function, fi : Qi ! Ai
² gi is the transition function from state to state gi : Qi £ A¡i ! Qi
The size of a ¯nite automaton is the number of its states, jQj.
We de¯ne a new game in strategic form GT(m1;m2) which denotes the T stage repeated
version of G, with the average payo® as evaluation criterion and with all the ¯nite automata
of size mi as the pure strategies of player i, i = 1;2. Let §i(T;mi) be the set of pure strategies
in GT(m1;m2) that are induced by an automaton of size mi:
A ¯nite automaton for player i can be viewed as a prescription for this player to choose his
action in each stage of the repeated game. If at state q the other player chooses the action
tuple a¡i, then the automaton's next state is gi(q;a¡i) and the action to be taken at stage 1 is
fi(qi). The action in stage 2 is fi(gi(qi;a
¡i
1 )) where a
¡i
1 is the action taken by the other players
in stage 1. More generally, de¯ne inductively,
7gi(q;b1;:::;bt) = gi(gi(q;b1;:::;bt¡1);bt),
where a¡i




For every automaton M for player i, de¯ne a strategy ¾i




t¡1)): A strategy ¾i for player i in GT is implementable by
the automaton M if ¾i is equivalent to ¾i
M i.e.: for every ¿ 2 §2(T); !(¾i;¿) = !(¾i
M;¿):
2.4 Notation
Let G = (f1;2g;A;r) be the two-player game in strategic form de¯ned in section 1.1. Denote
by K twice the largest absolute value of a payo® in the game G: Thus, ri(a) ¡ ri(b) ￿ K for
every a;b 2 A and i = 1;2:
Given the set X, co(X) means the convex hull of X:
Recall that ui(G) is the individual rational payo® of player i in pure strategies and denote
by F(G) the set of feasible and rational payo®s of G i.e., the set of payo® pro¯les x such that
x 2 co(r(A)) and xi > ui(G)
Denote by [x] the integer part of a real number x.
The number of elements of a set X is denoted by jXj:
Let f be a real function then:
f grows polynomially is denoted by f = O(p) for some polynomial p i:e: : f = nO(1):
f grows subexponentially is denoted by f = o(2n²);i:e: : 8²¶> 0
f
2n² < ² ¶for all su±ciently
large n:
2.5 Play complexity
The main results in play complexity are those given by Kalai and Stanford (1988) and Neyman
(1998). We present here the de¯nitions of the complexity of a strategy in G1 and then the
de¯nitions in GT.
First, a ¯nite sequence of actions (a1;:::;at) is compatible with a pure strategy ¾i if for every
1 ￿ s ￿ t; ¾i(a1;:::;as¡1) = ai
s: Let An(¾i) be the set of all sequences of actions of length n
that are compatible with ¾: Consider for any sequence of actions (a1;:::;at) and a pure strategy
¾i the new strategy (¾i j a1;:::;at) in G1 given by
8(¾i j a1;:::;as)(b1;:::;bs ¶) = ¾i(a1;:::;as;b1;:::;bs¶):
The number of di®erent reduced strategies that are induced by a given pure strategy ¾i
of player i in GT(m1;m2) and all ¾i-compatible sequences of actions of length n, for all n,
provides with a ¯rst measure of the complexity of ¾, comp1(¾i): This de¯nition has a natural
extension tothe¯nitely repeated game, GT. Let (¾t)T
t=1 where ¾ 2 §i(T) and de¯necomp2(¾) =
minfcomp2(¿) : ¿ 2 §iand 8t;1 ￿ t ￿ T;¾t = ¿tg:
Second, de¯ne comp2(¾i) as the size of smallest automaton that implements ¾i:
The two abovede¯nitions turnout tobe equivalent (Neyman, 1998, proposition2), comp1(¾i) =
comp2(¾i):
We shall often need bounds on the complexity of strategies that induce a given play. Hence,
for aplay !, de¯ne player i's complexity of !, compi(!); as the smallest complexity of astrategy
¾i of player i which is compatible with !:
compi(!) = inf fcompi(¾) : ¾ 2 §i is compatible with !g:
Let Q be a set of plays. A pure strategy ¾i of player i is conformable to Q if it is compatible
with any ! 2 Q: The complexity of player i of a set of plays Q is de¯ned as the smallest
complexity of a strategy ¾i of player i that is comformable to Q.
compi(Q) = inf fcompi(¾) : ¾ 2 §i is comformable to Qg
The following lemmata, proved in Neyman (1998), provide bounds ofthe complexity of some
particular plays which will be used in the proof of the main result. The ¯rst result provides
with an upper bound of the complexity of a sequence of actions of length t:
Lemma 1 Let a = (a1;:::;at) 2 At: Then compi(a) ￿ t:
Let a = (a1;:::;at) 2 At and b = (b1;:::;bs) 2 As; and denote by a+b = (a1;:::;at;b1;:::;bs) 2
At+s the concatenation of two histories. The second lemma states the complexity bound of such
a concatenation.
Lemma 2 Let a = (a1;:::;at) 2 At and b = (b1;:::;bs) 2 As: Then compi(a+b) ¸ max(compi(a);com
For a = (a1;:::;at) 2 At and a positive integer d, de¯ne d¤ a by induction on d : 1 ¤a = a:
and (d + 1)¤ a = d ¤a +a:
The complexity of a sequence of actions that changes in the last stage is stated next.
Lemma 3 Let a = (a1;:::;at) 2 At with a1 = a2 = ::: = at¡1 and ai
t¡1 6= ai
t: Then compi(a) = t:
9Let a = (a1;:::;at) 2 At and b = (b1;:::;bs) 2 As; and s with min(t;s) ¸ s ¡ 1 then de¯ne
a =s b if ar = br for every r < s:
Consider two ¯nite sequences of actions a and b such that the ¯rst action for player i in a
and b is di®erent.: ai
1 6= bi
1: The next lemma presents a lower bound for the complexity of a
play that consists of a cycle (t¤a+b) repeated d times and there is a deviation of player i after
the t¤a action pairs on. This result is useful to measure the complexity needed to deviate from
a given cycle play.
Lemma 4 Let a = (a1;:::;ak) 2 Ak and b = (b1;:::;bn) 2 An with ai
1 6= bi
1;t ¸ 0 and d ¸ 1:
Assume that ! = (!1;:::;!s) 2 As with (d¡ 1)(tk + n) +tk + 1 < s ￿ (d + 1)(tk + n) and
d ¤ (t¤a + b) =s ! and ((d + 1) ¤(t¤a + b))i
s 6= !i
s: Then compi(!) ¸ d(t+ 1):
Let f : A1 ! A2 be a 1-1 function and let a = (a1;:::;an) 2 An be a play with a2
t = f(a1
t) for
every 1 ￿ t ￿ n, then a is called a coordinated play. In case of a coordinated play, the number
of equivalence classes induced by a strategy ¾i conformable with ! is exactly the length of the
play. We need a complexity lower bound for a play that consists of a coordinated periodic play.
This is stated next.
Lemma 5 Let a = (a1;:::;an) 2 An be a coordinated play, b 2 A with b1 6= a1
1; and d 2 N:
Then compi(d ¤a + b) ¸ (d¡ 1)n + 1:
Finally, the next result states a lower bound for a play in terms of the number of consecutive
action of player i.
Lemma 6 Let a = (a1;:::;ak) be a play. Let Bi ½ Ai be a nonempty subset of the actions of
player i. Assume that k : Bi ! N is such that for every bi 2 Bi there is s = s(bi) < t¡ k(bi)
with as+1 = ::: = as+k(bi) = bi and ai
s+1 6= ai
s+k(bi)+1. Then comp(a) ¸
P
ai2Bik(ai):
By the de¯nition of the complexity of a strategy, the above lemmata are proved by counting
the number of di®erent strategies obtained when all possible plays ! are induced. Each induced
strategy generates an equivalence class of strategies and then the number of these equivalence
classes coincides with the number of the automaton states. The overall sketch of the proofs is:
1. Let ¾ be a strategy compatible with !:
2. Consider the set ofstrategies f(¾ j !t) j t 2 Ng where (¾ j !t) denotesthe strategy induced
by the play ! of length t
103. For each strategy consider the number of reduced strategies with the concatenation of
histories.
This last number is the cardinality ofthe set f(¾ j !t) j t 2 Ng and thus comp(¾) is obtained.
3 MAIN RESULT
The main result establishes the existence of an equilibrium payo® of GT(m1;m2) which is
"¡closed to a feasible and rational payo®. In the context of ¯nitely repeated games, deviations
in the last stages could be precluded if players did not know the end of the game. This may be
achieved if players implemented their strategies by playing with ¯nite automata which cannot
count until the last stage of the game. On the contrary, player i will deviate if he is able to
implement cycles of length at least the number of the repetitions. Hence, if players answered
to di®erent plays of length smaller than the number of repetitions then they could spend their
capacity and not be able to count until the end of the game. In this way, a player can ¯ll up the
rival's complexity by requiring him to conform with distinct plays of su±ciently large length,
i.e., approximately O("T):
To ¯ll up the complexity of the weaker player, the stronger player ( the one with the
biggest automaton) speci¯es the set of plays by means of a set of messages to be sent in the
communication phase. The complexity of the set of plays is determined by the complexity of
such a weaker player and the di®erence among the distinct plays is a small portion of each play
(the veri¯cationplay). Thus, what is being determined in each message is the above veri¯cation
play. Hence, to design the set of plays can be understood as a codi¯cation problem where what
is being coded is the weaker player's complexity.
Similarly to the existing literature (Neyman, 1998) we o®er the equilibrium conditions in
terms of the complexity of the smallest automaton whichimplements the equilibrium play. The
main di®erence is that both the upper and the lower bounds that we achieve include previous
bound's domains. This is due to our optimal construction of the set of veri¯cation sequences
and the associated communication scheme. We characterize the above set by selecting a subset
of sequences over a ¯nite alphabet. Since messages are a codi¯cation of plays we follow the
shortest codi¯cation in order to construct the communication phase1. We state informally
1This is in clear contrast with Neyman (1998) who does not construct the shortest communication phase
given his set of veri¯cation sequences.
11this ¯rst result which is needed to show that under our construction the sets of veri¯cation
and communication sequences are the optimal sets to codify the weaker player's complexity.
The formal statement of this result is presented in section 5 where we introduce the tools of
Information theory which are needed to prove it. Then, Theorem 1 establishes the existence of
an equilibrium payo® of GT(m1;m2) which is "¡closed to a feasible and rational payo® under
automaton bounds which are the best in the literature.
Result 1: The set of messages for the communication phase coincides with the set of
sequences for the veri¯cation play, i.e. an optimal codi¯cation map is the identity. In other
words, given our set of veri¯cation sequences there is not a shortest codi¯cation scheme.
The main result below presents the equilibrium conditions to reach a feasible and rational
payo® in a ¯nitely repeated game when players implement their strategies by means of ¯nite
automata.
Theorem 1 Let G = (f1;2g;A;r) be a two person game in strategic form. Then for every "
su±ciently small, there exist positive integers T0 and m0, such that if T ¸ T0, and x 2 co(r(A))
with xi > ui(G) and m0 ￿ minfm1, m2g ￿ exp("T) and maxfm1, m2g > T then there exists
y 2 E(GT(m1;m2)) with jyi ¡ xij < ":
Theorem 1 will follow from conditions on: 1) a feasible payo® x 2 co(r(A)); 2) a positive
constant " > 0; 3) the number of repetitions T, and 4) the bounds of the automata sizes,
m1;m2, that guarantee the existence of an equilibrium payo® y of the game GT(m1;m2) that
is "-close to x.
To see that our bounds include previous bound's domains we include here Neyman's result:
Theorem (Neyman, 1998): Let G = (f1;2g;A;r) be a two person game in strategic form.
Then for every " su±ciently small, there exist positive integers T0 and m0, such that if T ¸ T0,
and x 2 co(r(A)) with xi > ui(G) and m0 ￿ minfm1;m2g ￿ exp("3T) and maxfm1, m2g > T
then there exists y 2 E(GT(m1;m2)) with jyi ¡ xij < ":
One of the conditions of our theorem is stated by means of the inequalities mi ¸ m0
where m0 is su±ciently large. Another condition require the bound of one or both size to be
subexponential in the number of repetitions, i.e., a condition that asserts that (log mi)=T is
su±ciently small. The characterization of this conditionis related with the codi¯cation schemes
to be studied in Section 5.
124 THE SCHEME OF THE PLAY
In this section we present the scheme of the play to reach a feasible and rational payo® x in a
¯nitely repeated game. The plays along the equilibrium path are divided into a communication
phase followed by a play phase.
Assume without loss of generality that m1 ￿ m2: Knowing player 1's complexity, player 2
determines a precise number of plays from which one is selected and sent to player 1 in the
communication phase. This signal speci¯es one of the ¯nitely many plays of the repeated game
to be played in the play phase and it uses two actions that we label 0 and 1. Player 2 plays a
mixed strategy during this phase and player 1 responds properly to any message. The action
of Player 1 is independent of the message (signal) sent by player 2. Since player 2 proposes the
plays, messages have to be independent of the associated payo®s to each of them. We reach
this independence by means of balanced sequences, i.e., sequences with the same number of
zeros and ones. The speci¯cation of the set of messages and the correspondence with the set of
plays is crucial in our construction, because we associate each message from the communication
phase with a unique play in the play phase.
After the communication phase the equilibrium play enters into the play phase which con-
sists of a cycle repeated along the play until T. The length of the cycle does not depend on
the signal sent by player 2. Each one of the cycles has associated payo® approximately equal
to the e±cient and rational payo® x. Thus, in any one of the proposed plays, player 1 has no
incentive to deviate prior to the very last stages of the ¯nitely repeated game. The cycle has to
parts: the veri¯cation play and the regular play. The regular play is common for every signal
and it consists of a cycle of di®erent action pairs such that players reach a vector payo® "¡
close to the e±cient and rational targeted payo® x.
Player 2 follows a veri¯cation play to check that player 1 has spent all his states following
the play. It consists of a coordinated play with the identity as the function between A1 and A2 ,
i.e., both players play the same actions. In words, both players follow a monitoring phase such
that the sequence of actions can be understood as a coordination process which determines
each pure strategy. The sequence of actions played in this phase is a sequence whose empirical
distribution coincides with the uniform distribution and where the last element of the sequence
is ¯xed.
The veri¯cation scheme is constructed such that it satis¯es three properties. First, it is
balanced (the number of ones is equal to the number of zeros) to deter player 2's deviations by
13selecting the best payo® sequences. Second, this phase generates a payo® " close to x. Finally,
player 2 ¯lls up player 1's capacity by generating enough pure strategies so that the number of
remaining states is su±ciently small. In this way, player 1's deviations from the proposed play
by counting up until the last stage of the game are avoided. For instance, player 1 could be
able to select just one proposed play and deviate in the last stage of this play while repeating
the cycle in all other proposed plays. Similarly, he could increase his own payo® by neglecting
a subset of plays. Thus, the repetition of the cycle precludes sophisticated deviations by player
1.
There are two schemes that player 1 has to design to make a good use of his complexity.
Player 1 needs all the plays in his automaton to follow the right play until T. There are
many player 1's automata which could process the information sent by player 2. Given our
automaton framework we minimize the information processing of player 1 by using the same
states to process the signal and to follow the regular part of the di®erent cycles. However,
this introduces a di±culty since these states of player 1's automaton admit both actions 0 and
1. Moreover, Player 1 uses one automaton with the minimal number of states for each play.
The way to decrease this number is by reusing states for two di®erent actions. For instance,
player 1 can use the same state to implement the action pairs (0;0) and (0;1) because for the
action 0 he could accept both actions 0 and 1: This entails that there are deviations of player
2 that might be unpunished. If player 2 knew exactly the states that admit both actions, he
could take advantage over them in future stages of the game. These deviations can only be
undertaken by player 2 in the play phase, since the sequences from the communication phase
are balanced and thus he is indi®erent among the messages. To avoid this problem player 1
uses a mixed strategy whose support consists of the minimal subset of pure strategies which
are conformable with the proposed plays and such that it generates enough randomization to
obscure the location of his reused states. Player 1's mixed strategy is constructed by a uniform
distribution in this minimal subset.
Note that every player's behavior plays a di®erent role in the game. The signaling activity
of player 2 has two purposes: how to coordinate and how to ¯ll up player 1's capacity. And
these are the goals of the player 2's mixed strategy. On the contrary, player 1's role consists
of supporting the \coordination" proposed by player 2 by means of a mixed strategy. To this
end, player 1 builds a mechanism against player 2's undetectable deviations.
145 SEQUENCES AND CODIFICATION SCHEMES
We proceed to construct the set of veri¯cation sequences and the associated communication
scheme. The key points of the construction are: 1) the characterization of such sequences by
both their empirical distribution and they informational properties and 2) the design of the
set of communication sequences through the optimal codi¯cation of the veri¯cation set. This
approach produces our result 1 and clari¯es the di®erence between previous constructions and
ours.
Notice that in order to ¯ll upthe complexity of player 1, player 2 generates su±ciently many
plays which player 1 has to conform with. The di®erence among them is given by the sequences
of action pairs for the veri¯cation play because the regular play is common. Moreover, there is
a map between each play and each message related to the corresponding veri¯cation. Hence,
we look for the shortest way to construct messages associated to the veri¯cation play and to
be sent in the communication phase, such that this last phase is also the shortest one.
To ¯nd a solution to this problem is equivalent to solving a codi¯cation problem in Infor-
mation Theory, since the veri¯cation sequences have to be coded in the communication phase.
To codify means to describe a phenomenon. The realization of this phenomenon can be viewed
as the representation of a random variable. Then, a codi¯cation problem is just a one-to-one
mapping (the source code) from a ¯nite set (the range of a random variable or input) toanother
set of sequences of ¯nite length (output sequences). What is important here is that the length
of the output sequences is the shortest one with respect to the length (or probability) of the
input sequences.
In our setting the set of veri¯cation sequences is the input set and the set of messages
corresponds with the output set. We start with the set of balanced sequences of length k,
whose cardinality is2 about O(2k¡1) and which are the veri¯cation sequences. Our output set
consists of ¯nite length strings from the binary alphabet with the shortest length and again
with the balancedness condition.
Solving the codi¯cationproblem we obtain the set of messages for the communication phase.
Our codi¯cation veri¯es that it is the shortest one and the output sequences are balanced. By
tools of Information Theory we prove our result 1, i.e., that the trivial codi¯cation (the source
code is the identity) is optimal in the sense that its expected length is minimum and then there
is no code with shortest expected length that the identity. This result is due to the fact that
2See footnote 4 below.
15the set of sequences for the veri¯cation play is designed in such a way that player 1's complexity
(m1) is bounded by an integer which is the cardinal of the smallest set of balanced sequences.
If the above condition is not satis¯ed then there will exist non-trivial optimal source codes3.
The formal details of our construction are presented next. We consider ¯rst deterministic
sequences which satisfy some properties: they are balanced and the last component of each
sequence is ¯xed. We use the method of types and the Type set to de¯ne these sequences. In
second place, we analyze the information properties of these sequences by means of concepts
such as entropy and the Kullback distance. This allows us to view the Type Set as the set
of random sequences of a given entropy, even without knowing the actual random variable
whose distribution is emulated by the deterministic sequence. Finally, we present the minimal
codi¯cation of the Type Set with this alternative approach.
5.1 Deterministic Sequences: Type Set




. We will use
the notation xn and x interchangeably to denote a sequence x1;x2;:::;xn:
We look for the set of sequences whose empirical distribution is close enough to a given
distribution. We just consider rational distributions of a given length n.
De¯nition 1 The type Px (or empirical probability distribution) of a sequence x = x1;x2:::; xn
is the relative proportion of occurrences of each symbol of £, i.e., Px(a) =
N(ajx)
n for all a 2 £,
where N(a j x) is the number of times that a occurs in the sequence x 2 £n:
De¯nition 2 Given a length n, denote by Pn the set of types of sequences of length n;i:e:;
Pn = fPx j x 2 £ng













De¯nition 3 If P 2 Pn, then the set of sequences of length n and type P is called the type
class of P, denoted by T(P); i.e., T(P) = fx 2 £n : Px = Pg:
3Neyman's source code (1998) is also the identity but it is not the optimal one given his set of veri¯cation
sequences. In particular, he uses half of the communication sequences to specify the chosen play and the other
half to balance them, in clear contrast with our codi¯cation which uses a whole sequence to determine the play.
His construction produces that the set of possible plays is smaller than ours, i.e., a subset of ours, and then
that our upper bound on player's 1 complexity is larger than Neyman's upper bound.
165.2 Random sequences: Typical Set
We present here some basic results from Information Theory. For a more complete treatment
consult Cover and Thomas (1991).
Let X be a random variable over a ¯nite set £, whose distribution is p 2 ¢(£); i.e.,
p(µ) = Pr(X = µ) for each µ 2 £:
De¯nition 4 The entropyH(X) ofX is de¯ned byH(X) = ¡§µ2£p(µ)log(p(µ) = ¡EX [logp(X)];
where 0 log 0 = 0 by convention.
Notice that the entropy of a random variable depends on the distribution and not on the
values it takes and measures the amount of information contained in a random variable or in a
probability distribution.
Let X = (X1;:::;Xn) be a vector of ¯nite random variables over £n
k=1£k: Then by the
de¯nition of entropy,
H(X) = H(X1;:::;Xn) = ¡§µ12£1:::§µn2£np(µ1;:::;µn)logp(µ1;:::;µn) where p(µ1;:::;µn) =
p(X1 = µ1;:::;Xn = µn):
Given a pair of random variables (X1;X2) taking values in £1 £ £2 with joint distribution
p(µ1;µ2); we denote by p(µ2 j µ1) the conditional probability that X2 = µ2 given that X1 = µ1:
De¯ne h(X2 j µ1) = ¡§
µ22£2p(µ2 j µ1)logp(µ2 j µ1):
Thus h(X2 j µ1) is the entropy of X2 when the realization X1 = µ1 is known. Consider
h(X2 j ¢) as a random variable on £1 equipped with the marginal distribution of X1; p(µ1) =
§µ22£2p(µ1;µ2):
De¯nition 5 The conditional entropy H(X2 j X1) of X2 given X1 is de¯ned by
H(X2 j X1) = EX1 [h(X2 j X1)] =
P
µ12£1 p(µ1)h(X2 j µ1):
An easy computation shows that H(X1;X2) = H(X1) + H(X2 j X1) where H(X1;X2) is
the entropy of the variable (X1;X2): Then, the generalization of the above result is the next
proposition.
Proposition 1 If X = (X1;:::;Xn) is a vector of random variables then
H(X) = H(X1;:::;Xn) = H(X1) +
Pn
k=2H(Xk j X1;:::;Xk¡1):
17The entropy of arandom variableis ameasure of theuncertainty ofthe random variable, i.e.,
the amount of information required on the average to describe the random variable, while the
relative entropy (or Kullback Leiber distance) gives us the distance between two distributions.
It gives the level of ine±ciency of assuming that the distribution is q when instead the true one
is p:
De¯nition 6 The relative entropy of the probability mass function p(x) with respect to the
probability mass function q(x) is de¯ned as







Notice that the relative entropy is not a true distance since it is not symmetric and does
not satisfy the triangle inequality. Nevertheless, it is often consider as a distance between
distributions.
5.2.1 Typical set: Asymptotic Equipartition Property.
Consider independent, identically distributed ( i.i.d) random variables X1;:::;Xn. The law of
large numbers states that 1
n
Pn
i=1Xi is close to its expectedvalue, EX; for largevalues of n: The
Asymptotic Equipartition Property (AEP) is a consequence of the weak law of large numbers.
If X = X1;:::;Xn is a vector of i.i.d random variables and p(X1;::;Xn) is the probability
of observing the sequence X1;:::;Xn then 1
n log 1
p(X1;::;Xn) is close to the entropy H(X): The
Asymptotic Equipartition Property makes it possible to divide the set of all sequences into two
sets, the typical set, where the sample entropy is close to the entropy of the random variable,
and the non-typical set, which contains the other sequences. Any property that is proved for
the typical set will determine the behavior of a large sample. However, we might be able to
predict the probability of the sequence that we actually observe. We ask for the probability
p(X1;::;Xn) of the outcomes X1;:::;Xn; where X1;X2;::: are i.i.d » p(x): We are asking for
the probability of an event drawn according to the same probability distribution. It turns out
that p(X1;:::;Xn) is close to 2¡nH(p) with high probability. Almost all events are almost equally
likely.
For instance consider the random variable X 2 f0;1g with a probability mass function
de¯ned by p(1) = p andp(0) = q: If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. according to p(x). Then the probability
of a sequence x1;x2;:::;xn is
Qn
i=1p(xi): Clearly, it is not true that all 2n sequences of length n
have the same probability.
The asymptotic equipartition property is formalized in the following theorem:
18Theorem 2 (AEP): If X1;:::;Xn are i.i.d. with common distribution p(x) then
¡ 1
n logp(X1;:::;Xn) ! H(X) in probability.
De¯nition 7 The typical set A
(n)
± with respect to p(x1;:::;xn) is the set of sequences
(x1;:::;xn) 2 £n such that
2¡n(H(X)+±) ￿ p(x1;:::;xn) ￿ 2¡n(H(X)¡±)
As a consequence of the AEP, the cardinality of the set A
(n)
± veri¯es that






¯ ￿ 2n(H(X)¡±); for su±ciently large n.
Thus, the typical set has probability nearly 1, all typical sequences have about the same
probability 2¡nH(X) and by indexing the typical set has short descriptions of length ¼ nH:
5.3 Information Properties of the Type Set
The essential properties of the method of types arise from the following theorem, which states
that all sequences with the same type have the same probability and that the size of a type
class T(P) is related with the type entropy.
These expressions make it possible to compute the behavior of long sequences drawn i:i:d.
according to some distribution based on the properties of the type of the sequence. Then, if
X1;X2;:::;Xn are drawn i:i:d: according to q(x); the typical set associated with q(x) can be
considered as the Type Set of the empirical distribution associated with X1;X2;:::;Xn; where
the Kullback distance between the type P and q is small.
Theorem 3 a) If X1;X2;:::;Xn are i:i:d: according to q; then the probability of x depends on
its type and is given by qn(x) = 2¡n(H(Px)+D(Pxkq)):
b) 1
(n+1)j£j2nH(P) ￿ jT(P)j ￿ 2nH(P)
For the binary case we can write a better bound of the cardinality of T(P) by Stirling's








2) and length 2n with 1 ¡
1
22n ￿ ®n ￿
1+ 1
22n:





with 1 ￿ "n ￿ 1
11n.
195.4 Codi¯cation and data compression
Given a random variable X over a ¯nite set £, we are interested ingenerating a one-to-one map
(the source code) between the range of X and a ¯nite set with speci¯c properties. The most
important property among them is that the expected length of the source code of the random
variable is as short as possible. With this requirement we achieve an optimal data compression
which is important to identify a variable with a lower complexity.
Our purpose is to de¯ne a code from the support of the random variable distributed uni-
formly over sequences of length n (where n is even) with parity of ones and zeros in each of
them and witha ¯xed last component equal to one, intothe sequences belonging to the minimal
Type Set of length m. The input sequences are played in the veri¯cation phase and an optimal
codi¯cation of these sequences is used for the communication phase.
Knownresults inInformation Theory relatethe expected length ofthe codewiththe entropy
of the random variable to code. For instance, Shannon (1948) establishes that the length of
the code of each element of the range of the random variable is the logarithm of the inverse
of its associated probability. Then the expected length of the code is lower than the entropy
of the random variable. Also, Hu®man (see Cover and Thomas, 1991) constructs an algorithm
where the expected length of any source code is minimized and thus he provides with optimal
coding5. Next we present formally the de¯nitions of codi¯cation and data compression.
De¯nition 8 A source code C from a random variable X is a mapping from £, the range of
X, to D¤ the set of ¯nite length strings of symbols from a D-ary alphabet. Let C(x) denote the
codeword corresponding to x and let l(x) denote the length of C(x):
De¯nition 9 The expected length L(C) of a source C(x) for a random variable X with prob-
ability mass function p(x) is given by L(C) =
P
x2£ p(x)l(x), where l(x) is the length of the
codeword associated with x:
De¯nition 10 A code is said to be non-singular if every element of the range of X maps into
a di®erent string in D¤, i.e., xi 6= xj ) C(xi) 6= C(xj):
Non-singularity su±ces for an unambiguous description of a single value of X:
De¯nition 11 A codeword x is a pre¯x in a codeword y if there is a codeword z such that
xz = y.
5Hu®man also establishes an inverse ranking between the probabilities and the length of the codes of each
element. Elements with higher probability have an associated code of a shorter length and viceversa.
20De¯nition 12 A code c is called a pre¯x code or an instantaneous code if no codeword is a
pre¯x of any other codeword.
An instantaneous code can be decoded without reference to the future codewords since the
end of a codeword is immediately recognizable. The above property justi¯es the pre¯x code
as a good codes since there is no pre¯x part such that the end of each code is unique. The
su±cient condition to construct instantaneous code of minimum expected length is known as
the Kraft inequality. Formally:
Theorem 4 (Kraft inequality): For any instantaneous code over an alphabet of size D, the
codeword lengths l1;l2;:::;lm must satisfy the inequality §D¡li ￿ 1:
By the above de¯nitions we have to consider the coding of a source from a random variable
such that the expected length L(C) is as short as possible. This is equivalent to ¯nding the
instantaneous code with the minimum expected length, i,e., to minimize L =
P
pili subject
to §D¡li ￿ 1: By the use of the Lagrangian multipliers we get that the optimal codelengths
are l¤





pi logDpi = HD(X): Thus,
HD(X) ￿ L¤ with equality i® D¡li = pi:
Remark 1 Consider now a source alphabet of size 2k, with equidistribution. The entropy
associated is H = ¡
P2k
i=12¡k log2¡k = k. By the above bound on L¤, such a source is coded
by all codewords with length k.




2) of length n such that
the output of the codi¯cation veri¯es: 1) it consists of balanced sequences and 2) the last
component of each sequence is equal to 1. Notice that the set of the veri¯cation sequences V
satis¯es: 1) V ½ TPn¡1( n¡2
2n¡2; n











n < jV j < 2n¡1
n
and 3) V ½ f0;1g
m such that m is odd. Each sequence s 2 TPn¡1( n¡2
2n¡2; n
2n¡2) £ f1g has an
associated probability of 1
jVj: The next result establishes that these sequences have optimal
descriptions of length about n.
Proposition 2 Let C be a source code from TPn¡1( n¡2
2n¡2; n
2n¡2) £ f1g; uniformly distributed,
to the set of ¯nite length strings of a binary alphabet. Then the expected length of C is greater
than n ¡ 3 ¡ logn and smaller than n ¡ 1¡ logn:
6Assume that the ¯rst component refers to the frequency of ones and then the second component to that of
zeros.
21Proof:









































n ¡ 3 ¡logn < L(C) < n ¡1 ¡ logn ¤
Formal statement of Result 1: Let V ½ TPn¡1( n¡2
2n¡2; n
2n¡2)£f1g and Q = C(V), where
C is a source code with minimal expected length and with a balanced output. Then Q = V
and C is a bijective map.
Proof of Result 1: Let Q be the set of communication messages with Q = C(V ); where
V is the set of veri¯cation sequences. We prove here that Q = V .




¯ ¯: By the above theorem
it is clear that m > n ¡ 3: Recall that n is even and then such a smallest odd integer m is
n¡3+2 = n¡1: Thenthecommunication phase consists of sequences in TPn¡1( n¡2
2n¡2; n
2n¡2)£f1g
which already was the set V . Then the source code C is the identity7. ¤
The nature of the veri¯cation sequences which we want to codify is not a relevant infor-
mation to ¯nd the optimal set for the communication phase. We present next an alternative
approach for the construction of the set of veri¯cation sequences which allow us to relate our
communication scheme under strategic complexity (¯nite automata) with those in repeated
games with communication and full rationality (Lehrer, 1996; Lehrer and Sorin, 1997; Forges,
1990; Gossner, 1998; Gossner and Viellie, 1999 and Ben-Porath, 1998, among others).
To this end, recall that theentropy ofsequences of i.i.d. random variables is a key concept to
describe suchsequences. Also, in the framework of¯nite automata, it measureshowmany states
are needed to describe sequences and thus it is a good measure for communication schemes,
since their required "good properties" (better payo®s, no deviations from the equilibrium path,
7Notice that the cardinality of the set of veri¯cation sequences in Neyman (1998) is 2n¡1 < jVj ￿ 2n, and




2n0¡2) £ f1g where
n0 is the smallest even integer which satis¯es 2n0¡3
p
¼n0 > 2n. Then the optimal codi¯cation length of the sequences
belonging to this set is about n, instead of 2n which is Neyman's length for the communication sequences.
22etc.) are given with the minimal number of states. This minimality condition on the number
of states together with that of sequence-independent payo®s drive us to choose as the set of
veri¯cation sequences that of random variables with maximal entropy. Thus, we can consider
the set of veri¯cation sequences as a subset of a Typical set of length n given a random variable
X. Aconsequence ofthe AEP is that all sequences ofthe typical setof lengthn, A
(n)
± have about
the same probability 2¡nH(X) andby using the above remark 1 they have also short descriptions
of length ¼ nH: Obviously the random variable X has to be close to the empirical distribution
of the chosen Type set. The next lemma establishes the condition on the random variable X
such that the Typical Set of length n associated to X contains the type set TPn¡1( n¡2
2n¡2; n
2n¡2) :
the distribution of X has to be close enough to the uniform distribution. This condition allow
us to give an alternative proof of the result 1.














Let x = (x1;::;xn¡1;1) 2 TPn¡1( n¡2
2n¡2; n
2n¡2)£ f1g.
Let q = -i2f1;::;ngq be the distribution induced by a sequence of i.i.d. variables X1;::::;Xn.
It su±ces to prove that the probability of x = (x1;::;xn¡1;1) veri¯es that 2¡n(H(X)+±) ￿
q(x) ￿ 2¡n(H(X)¡±):
By the relationship between the type of x and that of q then q(x) = 2¡n(H(Px)+D(Pxkq))













2)logq(i) < H(q) +±
Then q(x) = 2¡n(H(Px)+D(Pxkq)) ¸ 2¡n(H(q)+±):
Hence 2¡n(H(X)+±) ￿ 2¡n(H(Px)+D(Pxkq)) ￿ 2¡n(H(X)¡±) and we conclude that
x = (x1;::;xn¡1;1) 2 A
(n)
± : ¤
Alternative proof of Result 1: By the above lemma we can consider that the set of
veri¯cation sequences is a subset of the typical set A
(n)
± associated to a sequence of i.i.d of
random variables with common distribution q: By the AEP the probability of each sequence
is about 2¡n(H(Px)+D(Pxkq)). Then, by remark 1, the shortest description of each sequence is n
23. The image of the source code corresponds with the sequences used in the communication
phase. The coding map is singular and then for any sequence in the veri¯cation phase there
exists a unique element (signal or message) in the type set of length n with corresponds with
the communication phase. ¤
6 PROOF OF THE MAIN RESULT
Let GT(m1;m2) be the ¯nite repetition played by ¯nite automata of the two-player game in
strategic form G = (f1;2g;A;r) and let x 2 co(r(A)) such that xi > ui(G); i = 1;2: Without






i=1¸i = 1. Consider the













The proof of the main result in the ¯rst case is a subcase of the proof of the second one.
A proof can be found in Neyman(1998); alternative proofs are provided by Papadimitriou and
Yannakakis (1994) and by Hernandez and Urbano (2000).




since it is rich enough to show the main features of the more general construction of the third






3 and denote a1
1 and a2
1 by 0 and a2
2 and a1
3 by 1 and assume that x =
¸0r(0;0) + ¸1r(1;1) + ¸2r(0;1); with ¸i > 0, i = 0;1;2 and where
P2
i=0¸i = 1: Then, either
¸0r2(0;0)+¸2r2(0;1) > (u2(G)+2")(¸0+¸2), or r2(1;1) > u2(G)+2" and we assume this last































d0 = l¡ d1 ¡ dd2 ¡ d(d + 1)=2 ¡ dd3
l1 = d0 + d1
Now, we de¯ne the play by means of a communication phase and a regular phase. This last
phase consists of a cycle with two parts. The ¯rst one is a veri¯cation phase which is related
with the communication phase. The second one starts with the action pairs (0;0) and also
includes all the required actions pairs (0;1) to achieve the payo® x in the cycle. The third part
is the remainder of the action pairs (0;0) and then all action pairs (1;1): The cycle is repeated
until the end of the game.
More speci¯cally, the number l above is the length of the cycle that both players repeat
until the end of the game. The cycle consists of playing the actions pairs (0;0), (1;1), (0;1)
in such a way that the payo® x is obtained, i.e., the number of times that each action pair
is played is approximately l¸i; i = 0;1;2; respectively. For every T (the length of the game),





￿ L < 1
"2: To ensure that
at the end of the repeated game player 1 is in the regular play where the action pair (1;1) is
played, we choose l = [ T
L+±] where 1
2 < ± < 1 and (L + 1)l ¡ T << l and (L+ 1)l > T. To





. The number of times that the action
pair (1;1) is played is about ¸1l and then d1 is the integer part. The action pairs (0;0) and
(0;1) are not played consecutively. The number of times that the action pair (0;0) is played is
d0 plus dd3 which is about ¸0l and that of the action pair (0;1) is dd2: The integer number d
is su±ciently large to accommodate all pair actions in such a way that the number of reused
states in the player 1's automaton is relatively small.
6.1 Equilibrium play
The following is a construction of an equilibrium point (¾¤;¿¤) of GT(m1;m2) with associated
equilibrium vector payo® (y1;y2) with jyi ¡ xij < ".
The mixed equilibrium strategy of player 2, ¿¤, chooses randomly a pure strategy ¿² where
² is an element of the message space Q. The message space Q is a set of sequences of length
2k, where k depends on the parameters of the game, T and m1. Moreover it veri¯es several
conditions: every message is a sequence with the same number of ones and zeros and the last
component is 1. Thus Q is a subset of T(P) with P = (1
2; 1
2) and with sequences of length 2k.
25Each pure strategy ¾ in the support of ¾¤ of player 1 and the pure strategy ¿² of player 2
induce a play !(¾;¿²) = (!1(¾;¿²);:::;!T(¾;¿²)) that depends on ², and therefore we denote
it by !(²) = (!1(²);:::;!T(²)) and call it the proposed play. The payo® associated to !(¾;¿²)
does not depend on the selected message ².
Player 2 communicates his choice of ² in Q at the beginning of the play to player 1, who
processes this information. The action of player 1 in the communication phase is independent
of ² and player 2 speci¯es the proposed play !(²) with his message. After the communication
phase, the proposed play enters in a cycle of length l. First, players verify the proposed play by
following the veri¯cation play for 2k stages. It consists of a coordinated play of actions pairs
(0;0) and (1;1). Then, both players play the regular play consisting of the action pairs (0;0);
(0;1) and (1;1) for the remaining stages until l:
The strategy of player 1 will detect withpositive probability any deviation of player 2. Some
deviation of this player will be detected immediately with positive probability, and others will
lead to a detection with positive probability in a future stage. The strategy of player 1 triggers
to punishing (playing the strategy that holds player 2 down to u2(G); denoted by Di ) forever
once he detects a deviationby player 2. We turn now to the formal construction of the proposed
play and the associated equilibrium strategies.
The set of messages
We startwiththeconstructionoftheset Q, andtheintegersk andl1. First, let k = k(m1;l1),




2 > m1¡l1. We will see that the numberof pure strategies




and by Lemma 6 the complexity of each pure strategy is at least











Recall that l is the length of the cycle. For every T (the length of the game), the cycle has
to be repeated a large number of times, L. Also, recall that l1 = d0+d1 where d1 is the number
of action pairs (1;1) along the cycle of length l, i.e., l¸1 and d0 is approximately l¸1
L : Then l1
is a function of O("T):
To build the set of messages, consider the set of equidistributed sequences of zeros and ones
of length 2k and such that the last component of each of them is a 1. These sequences have the
property that their empirical distribution correspond with the type (1
2; 1
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2) of length 2k and where the last component of
each sequence is a 1 to mark the end ofboth the communication phase andthe veri¯cation play.




















The associated play to a given message
For every ² we de¯ne the associated play !(²) of GT, i.e., a sequence !(²) = (!1(²);:::;!T(²))
with !t(²) = (!1
t(²);!2
t(²)) in A. As noted above, the play consists of a communication phase
followed by a play phase. We set µ(²) as the communication phase. The play phase, denoted
by c(²), is a cycle which is repeated until the end of the game except for the last stage T: This
phase consists of the veri¯cation play µ¤(²) and the regular play e c.
The purpose of the regular play e c is twofold: to achieve the payo® x and with the lowest
complexity8. Since x = ¸0r(0;0) + ¸1r(1;1) + ¸2r(0;1), an easy way to reach x would be to
play l¸0 times (0;0), followed by l¸2 times (0;1) and by l¸1 times (1;1), with an associated
complexity for player 1 of l. By lemma 6, x could even be achieved with a complexity of
l(¸0+¸1): However, it is possible to reduce the above complexity by repeating the action pairs
in a di®erent way while keeping the same proportion than above. For instance, the action pair
(0;0) could be played a number of times and then introduce subplays of appropriated length
of the other action pairs (0;1) and (1;1). The connection among di®erent subplays is marked
by the action pair (0;1). Speci¯cally, the play of the action pair (0;0) consists of its \shortest"
repetition such that player 1 can safely accept the remaining action pairs (0;0) and (0;1) (by
using his reused states). To this end e c is composed of three di®erent parts: The play c¤, plus
the play of d0¡ k times of (0;0)0s and the play of d1¡ k times of (1;1)0s. In this way, player 1
can insert the l¸2 repetitions of (0;1)0s in the states with a0 as the action function and thus the
play c¤ consists of action pairs (0;0) and (0;1), while the second play is just (0;0) action pairs,





8Notice that we look for a construction which can be implemented by the player with the lowest complexity.
In this way we achieve the less restrictive equilibrium conditions.
27The construction of the cycle is as follows. Let
e c = c¤+ (d0 ¡ k)¤ (0;0)+ (d1 ¡ k) ¤ (1;1)




(d3 ¤ (0;0)+ (d2 ¡ 1)¤ (0;1) + (i ¡ 1) ¤(0;0) +(0;1))
Notice that j(d3 ¤(0;0) +d2 ¤ (0;1) + (i ¡ 1) ¤ (0;0) + (0;1))j = d3+d2+i; which does not
follow a cyclical pattern. Also, observe that the di®erence between the payo® of a run of c¤
and that of the corresponding part of (0;0)0s and (0;1)0s of x is su±ciently small, i.e.,
°
°








The play c¤ is designed such that the action pair (0;1) is played about l¸2 times and the
complexity of the regular play is minimized. To this end, player 1 uses the same action pair
(0;1) as a signal or marker to change from a subplay to another in each run of c¤. In this
way, the complexity of e c decreases from l(¸0 +¸1) to d0 +d1 (see lemma 10). Notice that the
above upper bound is the number of action pairs (0;0) and (1;1) which are needed (to reach
the payo® x) in a cycle of length l, where the pair (0;1) is used as a signal for player 1. The last
i-(0;0) action pairs are used as a counting device to assure that the number of runs is exactly
d. Notice that the regular play is designed to compress the actions pairs (0;0) by means of the
action pairs (0;1) included in c¤.
Recall that the veri¯cation play µ¤(²) and the regular play e c form the cycle c(²) that is
repeated until the end of the game except the last stage T: Then, de¯ne this cycle c = c(²) of
length l by:
c = c(²) = µ¤(²)+ e c = µ¤(²) +c¤ + (d0 ¡ k) ¤(0;0) +(d1¡ k) ¤(1;1).
Also, recall that comp1(e c) ¸ (d0 ¡ k) +(d1 ¡ k) and then comp1(c) = comp1(µ¤(²) + (d0 ¡
k)¤(0;0)+(d1¡k)¤(1;1)) = d0+d1 = l1. The play c¤ allows player 1 to reduce his complexity
of e c and then the complexity of c(²).
In the last stage of the game player 2 plays the best response to the action 1 of player 1,
denoted by b2. Then !T(²) = (1;b2).
28The associated play to a given ² in Q is given by:
!(²) = µ(²) + L(µ¤(²)+ c¤ +(d0 ¡ k)¤ (0;0)+ (d1 ¡ k)¤ (1;1)) +
µ¤(²)+ c¤+ (d0 ¡ k)¤ (0;0)+
(T ¡ 2k ¡ lL¡ (l ¡ (d1 ¡ k)) ¡ 1)¤ (1;1)+ (1;b2):
To summarize, a play !(²) = (!1(²);:::;!T(²)) with !t(²) = (!1
t(²);!2
t(²)) in A is as follows:
!t(²) =
8
> > > > > > > <
> > > > > > > :
(0;²t) if 0 ￿ t ￿ 2k
µ¤(²) if 2k < t mod l ￿ 4k
c¤ if 4k < t mod l ￿ 4k + l¡ d1 ¡ do
(0;0) if 4k +l ¡ d1 ¡ do < t mod l ￿ 3k + l¡ d1
(1;1) if 3k +l ¡ d1 < t mod l ￿ 2k + l
9
> > > > > > > =
> > > > > > > ;
!T(²) = (1;b2)
The ¯rst row corresponds with the communication phase where player 2 sends the message
² and player 1 plays 0. The veri¯cation phase is represented by the second row. The third,
fourth and ¯fth rows coincide with the rest of the cycle of length l. The cycle is repeated until
the end of the game.
Properties of the associated play
In this section we study ¯rst how close to x is the payo® induced by the cycle c(²) and by its
associated play !(²); and second, the complexity of player 1 associated to both the play !(²)
and the set of plays Q. The ¯rst two lemmae assert that for T su±ciently large, the payo®
induced by c(²) and by the proposed play !(²) is "-close to the equilibrium payo® x and it is
independent of the signal. The last lemma of this section establishes a lower bound for the
di®erent plays to measure player 1's complexity on the set of plays Q:








The number of action pairs (0;0), (1;1) and (0;1) has to be approximately l¸0, l¸1 and l¸2
(respectively). The number of times of (0;0)0s; (1;1)0s and (0;1)0s in the play c is k + dd3 +
d(d ¡ 1)=2 +d0¡ k, k + d1 ¡ k, and dd2 + d respectively.
Since d0 = l¡ d1 ¡ dd2 ¡ d(d +1)=2 ¡dd3 then
k +dd3+ d(d ¡ 1)=2 + d0¡ k = l ¡ dd2 ¡ d¡ d1.
Notice that jl¸0 ¡ k +dd3+ d(d ¡ 1)=2+ d0 ¡ kj = jl¸0 ¡ l¡ dd2 ¡d ¡ d1j =
= jl¸1¡ d1 + l¸2 ¡ dd2 ¡ dj ￿ jl¸1 ¡ d1j + jl¸2¡ dd2¡ dj < 1+ d
Then for su±ciently large values of T, jRi(c(²))¡ xij < "
2. ¤
Lemma 9 The vector payo®
PT
t=1r(!t(²)) is independent of ², and for su±ciently large values
of T,




t=1r(!t(²)) is independent of ² because the communication and the veri¯cation
plays consist of balanced sequences. Then, bothphases are independent of the chosen sequence.
Notice that jRi(!t(²)) ¡ Ri(c(²))j < K
L.
By the above lemma jRi(!(²)) ¡ xij = jRi(!(²)) ¡ Ri(c(²)) + Ri(c(²)) ¡ xij






Both players' complexity give us the equilibrium conditions on the automaton sizes. Player
2's complexity on a given play !(²);i.e., comp2(!(²)); is equal to T + 1: To ¯nd out a lower
bound of player 1's complexity, we study his play complexity associated to ², i.e., comp1(!(²)).
Player 1 has to respond correctly to each signal and thus we compute his complexity on the
set of plays !(²) for ² 2 Q, comp1(Q); where Q is the set of plays. Recall that a player's
complexity of a set of plays Q is de¯ned as the smallest complexity of a strategy ¾ which is
conformable to Q:
To compute comp1(Q), we have to consider the coordinated and the non-coordinated plays.
The coordinated plays consist of the play of both the veri¯cation phase of length 2k and the
last action pairs (d1 ¡ k )(1;1). Hence, a lower bound of player 1's complexity is the number
of di®erent coordinated plays in the play phase. Their complexity is exactly their length which
30coincides with the number of the action pairs in the veri¯cation play plus the number of (1;1)0s
after c¤. Notice that the play of c¤, i.e., (!d3++2k+1(²);:::!l¡d1¡d0+k(²)), is not a coordinated
play: its play complexity is obtained by lemma 6. Then, to bound player 1's complexity on
the set of plays !(²); ² 2 Q, we ¯nd lower bounds of both the two coordinated plays in !(²)
and the non-coordinated part of !(²). With them, it is shown that a lower bound of player 1's
complexity, comp1(Q); is jQjl1:
Lemma 10 1)For every (²;t);(²0;t0) 2 Q £ (f1;:::;2k + d3g [fl¡ d1 + k + 1;:::;l ¡ 1g) with
(²;t) 6= (²0;t0)
(!t(²);:::!t+l1¡1(²)) 6= (!t0(²0);:::;!t0+l1¡1(²0))
2) Let ! = (!d0+1(²);:::!l¡d1+k(²)), a lower bound of player 1's complexity of ! is comp1(!) ¸
d0
3) By 1) and 2) comp1(Q) ¸ jQjl1
Proof:
1) To bound player 1's complexity on !(²); ² 2 Q, we ¯nd ¯rst lower bounds of both the
two coordinated plays in !(²) and the non-coordinated part of it.
After the communication phase for 2k < tmodl ￿ 4k + d3 and l ¡ d1 + k < tmodl ￿ l
both players follow a coordinated play. We have to prove that for every (²;t);(²0;t0) 2 Q £
(f1;:::;2k + d3g[fl¡ d1 + k;:::;lg) with (²;t) 6= (²0;t0), then
(!t(²);:::!t+l1¡1(²)) 6= (!t0(²0);:::;!t0+l1¡1(²0)).
It su±ces to show that for any pair (²;t) 6= (²0;t) and 2k < tmodl ￿ 4k+d3 and l¡d1+k <
tmodl ￿ l either there exists 0 ￿ s ￿ l with (!t(²);:::;!t+s(²)) 6= (!t0(²0);:::;!t0+s(²0)); or there
exists 0 ￿ s ￿ l with !t+s(²) 6= !t0+s(²0):
Suppose that t = t0 and thus ² 6= ²0. Therefore there exists 0 ￿ s0 < 2k with ²s0 6= ²0
s0. Let
s = l ¡ t+ s0 such that 0 ￿ s ￿ l: We conclude that !t+s(²) 6= !t+s(²0):
Next, suppose that t 6= t0. We can always choose one s such that the !t+s(²) is in the regular
part and !t0+s = !l+2k. With that we conclude that !t+s(²) = (0;0) and !t0+2k(²0) = (1;1):
More speci¯cally, suppose that t < t0. If t0 ¡ t > l ¡ d1 ¡ 2k, and t0 + 2k + 1 < l setting
s = 2k + l ¡ t + 1; t0 + s = l + 2k + 1 + t0 ¡ t then !t0+s(²) = (1;1) and !t+s(²) = (0;0): If
t0¡t ￿ d1¡k as d1 > 2k setting s = 2k +l¡t0 +1; then !t+s(²) = (1;1) and !t0+s(²0) = (0;0).
Note that this choice is independent of ²;²0 2 Q.
2) Toboundthecomplexity ofthe non-coordinatedpart, i.e., ! = (!d3+2k+1(²);:::!l¡d1+k(²))
we use lemma 6 where B1 = f0g and k(0) = d0. Then comp1(!) ¸ d0:
313) By adding the above complexity bounds then comp1(Q) ¸ jQjl1: ¤
6.2 Construction of the equilibrium strategy of player 2
We now describe player2's equilibrium strategy. It consists of a mixed strategy supported by
j Q j pure strategies. For every ² 2 Q, a proposed play !(²) is associated to a pure strategy
in the support of ¿¤; the equilibrium mixed strategy. Player 2 follows the proposed play and
punishes forever as soon as he detects a deviation. Thus, for any ² 2 Q , ¿² = (¿²
t)T
t=1 is the




t(²) if (s1;:::;st¡1) = (!1(²);:::;!t¡1(²));
D2 otherwise
The pure strategy ¿² 2 §2(T;T+1), i.e., ¿²isimplementedby anautomaton< f1;:::;T;T +1g;1
f2
²; g2
² > of size T +1 where:
² f1;:::;T;T + 1g is the set of states.
² 1 is the initial state.
² The action function f2
² de¯ned by f2
²(t) = !2
t(²) if t ￿ T;f2
²(T + 1) = D2.
² The transition function g2
²; de¯ned by g2
²(t;a) = t + 1 if a = !1
t(²) and t ￿ T, and
g2
²(t;a) = T + 1 otherwise, i.e., if a 6= !1
t(²), or if t = T + 1.
6.3 Construction of the equilibrium strategy of player 1
Player 1's equilibrium strategy is amixed strategy. Player 1has toanswer correctly to anysignal
sent by player 2. Hence, eachpurestrategy that belongs to the mixedequilibrium strategy must
be conformable with the set of plays f!(²) : ² 2 Qg: In the communication phase player 1 has
to process the information sent by player 2 and he does it by using the same states than those
for the regular play. The veri¯cation play consists of a coordinated play where both players
play the same action at the same time. The regular play is composed of two di®erent parts. In
the ¯rst one c¤ is played. The second part consists of a coordinated play with d0 ¡ k action
pairs of (0;0)0s followed by d1¡k action pairs of (1;1)0s. To reduce the associated complexity
player 1 reuses states with action function 0 to implement both action pairs (0;0) and (0;1):
32Recall that in these states player 1 cannot punish deviations since both action are admitted
and thus he construct an equilibrium mixed strategy that conceals the disposition of his reused
states in the regular play. The di®erence among player 1's pure strategies in the support of
the equilibrium strategy is the location of these states for the communication phase and for
the play of c¤ in the regular play. Player 1's mixed strategy is a uniform distribution over the
minimal subset of pure strategy ¾ 2 §1(m1) where ¾ is conformable with f!(²) : ² 2 Qg: The
minimal set is understood as the minimal set with enough uncertainly about the true locations
of his reused states.
6.3.1 The Automaton of player 1
The mixed equilibrium strategy of player 1, ¾¤ 2 ¢(§(m1;T)); is a mixture of pure strategies,
each one being implemented by an automaton conformable with Q: Each automaton has to
implement the communication phase and the play phase. We de¯ne ¯rst, the state space
and the action function which implement !(²); for all ² 2 Q. Second, we present the transition
function for the play phase, i.e., the veri¯cation play and the regular play. Finally, we construct
the transition function for the communication phase which determines the initial state.
The state space is
M1 = f®g[ Q£ f1;:::;l1g










µj(²) if 1 ￿ j ￿ 2k
0 if 2k < j ￿ d0 +k
1 if d0 +k < j ￿ d0 +d1 = l1
The play phase: The play phase is a cycle which is composed of the veri¯cation play and
the regular play. The ¯rst one is a coordinated play of length 2k and it is independent of the
pure strategy selected by player 1. The regular play consists of a play which is independent, or
deterministic part, and another play which depends on the pure strategy selected by player 1.
We start with the description of the deterministic part which is quite similar to that of Neyman
(1998).
33We visualize the states of the automaton of the form (²;j) as arranged in a rectangular
array with jQj rows and l1 columns. Recall that l1 = 2k + d0 ¡ k + d1 ¡ k: The rows are
indexed by the di®erent elements ² in Q and the columns are indexed by 1;:::;l1: We may think
that every row corresponds to a pure strategy of player 2. Given ² in Q, in the ¯rst 2k states
the action function assigns an action ²j if 1 ￿ j ￿ 2k which depends on the row (veri¯cation
phase). Then, the action is 0 in each state whose column is between 2k + 1 to l1 ¡ d1 ¡ k.
For the last d1 ¡ k columns, the action function assigns the action 1. The number of columns
coincides with the complexity of player 1's cycle.









Suppose that the regular play has 67 columns, where d0 = 33 and d1 = 40 and that the
veri¯cationplay has 6 associated columns. The ¯lled disks (²) represent states ofthe automaton
whose action function is a 0, when player 2 plays a 0 as well. The small disks (±) represent
states that play the action 1 when player 2 plays a 1. The big disks (°) mean the ¯nal states
of the regular play where both players have to play 1 at the same time. The transition function
in these last states goes to the ¯rst state in the same row. The horizontal arrows indicate the
transition of the automaton when player 1 follows a coordinated play.
± ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
± ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
± ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
± ! ² ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
² ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
² ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
² ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
² ! ± ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
² ! ± ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
± ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
± ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
± ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
± ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ± ! ² ! ² ! ¢¢¢ ! ² ! ± ! ± ! ¢¢¢ !
J
Veri¯cation Play Regular Play
Figure 1.
34Next we de¯ne the transition function for the play phase. According to the di®erent nature
of the plays in this phase (deterministic and random) the transition function is designed such
that it allows both punishing deviations immediately in the deterministic part and precluding
deviations in the random one.
The transition of the automaton is de¯ned such that for each ¯xed ² 2 Q, player 1 remains
in the same row and goes to the next column in case player 2 plays correctly in the veri¯cation
phase andfor states (²;j) with 2k < j ￿ d0+k if player 2 plays a 0 andfor states d0+k ￿ j < l1
when player 1 plays a 1. For the state (²;l1); if player 2 plays 1 then the transition function
goes to the ¯rst column in this row, i.e., player 1 starts another repetition of the cycle if player




(²;j + 1) if 1 ￿ j < 2k and ²j = 0





(²;j +1) if 1 ￿ j < 2k and ²j = 1
(²;j +1) if l1 ¡ d1 + k ￿ j < l1
(²;1) if j = l1
The states of the automaton of the form (²;j) such that 1 ￿ j ￿ 2k or d0 + k ￿ j ￿ l1
implement a coordinated play. Any deviation from this play at these states results in punishing
forever.
g1((²;j);e) = ® if 1 ￿ j ￿ 2k and ²j 6= e
g1((²;j);1) = ® if d0 +k ￿ j ￿ l1
The state ® is an absorbing state and then player 1 punishes forever after the ¯rst deviation
is detected. The transition function is as follows:
g1(f®g;¤) = ®:
Up to now, we have de¯ned the deterministic part of the regular phase. To reduce the
complexity of the cycle, player 1 reuses states whose action function is a 0 and he uses the
action 1 of player 2 as a signal to start another run of c¤. These states are of the form (²;j)
with 2k < j ￿ d0 ¡ 5k with no reused state following c¤ and processing the signal in the
communication phase. There are dd2 states that tolerate both actions 0 and 1: To conceal the
35location of these states we add a random procedure to implement the action pairs (0;1) which
are played in the play c¤: This random procedure is de¯ned by the following random integers:
Let z be aninteger number suchthat 1 ￿ z ￿ 2andL = 2d2+d3+d . Set arandom increasing
function ½ : f1;:::;Lg !
©
2k + d3 + 1;:::;d0¡ 4k ¡ L
ª
with ½(i+1) > ½(i)+Ld2+d3+d, and
consider a random sequence of elements i1;::;id of f1;:::;Lg:
Recall that c¤ =
Pd
i=1(d3 ¤ (0;0)+ (d2 ¡ 1) ¤(0;1) + (i ¡ 1)¤ (0;0)+ (0;1)). Now, we can
de¯ne the transition function of player 1's automaton implementing c¤ :
We start with the de¯nition of the transition function of the state (²;2k), i.e., when the
veri¯cation play ¯nishes. Player 2 has to play the action 1 and then player 1 jumps to the
column ½(i1)¡d3 which it is unknown to player 2. In this way player 2 is uncertain about the
¯rst reused states in c¤. The transition function is de¯ned by:
g1((²;2k);1) = (²;½(i1)¡ d3):
For every 1 ￿ t ￿ d we de¯ne the transition function for the states whose action function
is a 0 but accept the action 1 of player 2, i.e., these states implement the action pairs (0;1) in
c¤ as:
g1((²;½(it) + zs);1) = (²;½(it) + zs +s) if 0 ￿ s < d2
and
g1((²;½(it) + s);1) =
(
(²;½(it+1) ¡ d3) if s = ½(it) + zd2 +t and t < d
(²;2k + 1) if s = ½(it) + zd2 +t and t = d
The ¯rst row is the transitionfunction for every d2 stagesof (0;1) in c¤ given it, for0 < t ￿ d:
The second one de¯nes the transition function for the last (0;1); for every repetition t < d.
Notice that the assumptions on the random sequence i1;::;id, imply that for 1 ￿ t < t0,
½(it)+t 6= ½(it0)+t0: Finally, the last row is the transition function for the last (0;1) for the last
repetition of c¤. The states that admit both actions are properly located in the ¯rst d0 states.
The next ¯gure illustrates the transition function in the regular phase implementing c¤:
We consider two cases: 1) assume that L = 2 then d = 24 = 16 and d3 = 3 = d2. Let
i1;::;i16 = 1;2;1;::: and ½(1) = 14 and ½(2) = 58 ; 2) assume now that L = 2 then d = 24 = 16
and d3 = 3 = d2. Let i1;::;i16 = 2;1;1;::: and ½(1) = 14 and ½(2) = 58:
36¯!²!²!²!²!²!¦!²!¦!²!¦!²!¦!²!²!¦¢ ¢¢¢¢¢ ! ²!²!²!¦!²!¦!²!¦!²!¦
1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23! ¢¢¢! 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Case 2:
¯! !²!²!²!¦!²!¦!²!¦!²!¦!²!²!²¢¢¢¢¢¢ ! ²!²!²!¦!²!¦!²!¦!²!²!¦
1 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23! ¢¢¢! 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65
Case 1:
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?
Figure 2.
The communication phase: In the communication phase player 1 has to process the in-
formation sent by player 2. He uses the same states to be used in the regular play. We design
the transition function for the ¯rst 2k stages such that player 1 follows a speci¯c play after
the communication phase and he conceals his reused states by changing their locations in his
pure strategies. In other words, each pure strategy in the support of player 1's mixed strategy
is designed such that it selects the right row along the communication phase and it does not
reveal which states admit both actions.
The transition function of player 1's automaton in this phase depends on the pure strategy
selected. Each pure strategy is given by two random numbers p and n. The ¯rst of them
determines the initial state of the automaton. We denote this initial state by (1;p). Thus, p is
the column where player 1 processes the signal sent by player 2 and it veri¯es that d0 ¡ 5k ￿
p ￿ d0 ¡ 3k.
Given ² = (²1;:::;²i;:::;²2k¡1;1) 2 Q let k² be the smallest integer such that
Pk²
i=1²i = k or
k² ¡
Pk²
i=1²i = k: The random integer n 2 f1;2g determines the jumps in the columns ( along
the same row) that player 1 follows in the communication phase when player 2 sends a 1 after
k² stages.
The transition function of the communication phase consists of three parts: the ¯rst one
corresponds to the ¯rst stages until k²; the second to k² until 2k ¡1, and ¯nally the third part
refers to the last stage of the communication.
Thus, to select the right row during the ¯rst stages, the transition function jumps among
the di®erent rows guarantying that when the number of either ones or zeros is greater or equal
37than k the state of the automaton is in the row that corresponds to player 2's sequence of
actions in the ¯rst k² stages of the game. This row is the one where the ¯rst components are
the corresponding to the signal sent by player 2, followed by the maximal number of zeros.
Thus, player 2's signals are ranked in this way. This is achieved through the following partial
transition function:
If ² = (²1;:::;²2k¡1;1) 2 Q and
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i < k and (j ¡ p) ¡
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i < k and
h = k ¡ (j ¡ p)¡
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i then
g1((²;j);1) = ((²1;:::;²j¡p;1;0;:::;0;²j¡p+1+h;:::;1);j + 1) if p ￿ j ￿ p+ 2k
If ² = (²1;:::;²2k¡1;1) 2 Q and
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i = k or (j ¡ p)¡
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i = k and
h = k ¡ (j ¡ p) ¡
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i then g1((²;j);1) = (²;j + n) if p ￿ j ￿ p+ 2k
g1((²;j);0) = (²;j + 1) if p ￿ j ￿ p +2k
In second place, we design the transition function9 when player 2 is sending the last part
of the signal except for the last stage, i.e., for t : k² > t > 2k. Here, the randomness of the
jumps, n, allows player 1 to hide his reused states. Recall that n 2 f1;2g, then:
If ² = (²1;:::;²2k¡1;1) 2 Q and
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i = k or (j ¡ p)¡
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i = k and n = 1; then
g1((²;j);1) = (²;j +1) if p+ k² ￿ j < p+ 2k
If ² = (²1;:::;²2k¡1;1) 2 Q and
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i = k or (j ¡ p) ¡
Pj¡p
i=1 ²i = k and k² = 2 £ (k ¡
Pk²
i=1²i ¡ 1)+ (k ¡ k² +
Pk²
i=1²i) and n = 2, then
g1((²;j);1) = (²;j + 2) if p +k² ￿ j < p +k²
Finally, the last state in the communication phase is not in the same column for every row.
It depends on ², n, p, i.e., on where the communication starts, on the distribution of ones in ²
and on the number of jumps.
Let e v be a function
e v :
Q ¡! [p;:::;p+ 3k]




9Notice that we do not use a distribution over transition functions, but we produce enough uncertainty on
the ¯nal states of the transition function to deter deviations.
38Notice that the max e v(²) is when ² = (0;:::;0;1;:::;1) 2 Q and then e v(²) = p +3k ¡ 2.
Now itis possibletode¯ne the ¯nal state's transitionfunctionfor everyrow: g1((²;e v(²));1) =
(²;1):
This is equivalent to: g1((1;p);²) = (²;1):
In all other cases the value of g1 equals ®.
Figure 3 illustrates the communicationphase associated to the veri¯cation play in the above
example for k = 3 and n = 2. The star (? ) is the initial state. The diamonds (¦) represent
those states in the regular play that are used to process the information sent by player 2 in
the communication phase, and thus admit both actions 0 and 1 from player 2. The big states
with a dot are the states in the regular play that player 1 uses to determine the end of the
communication phase. These states also admit both actions, 0 and 1.
² ! ² ! ² ! ² !
J
1 1 0 0 0 1
² ! ² ! ² ! ² !
J
1 0 1 0 0 1
² ! ² ! ² ! ² !
J
1 0 0 1 0 1
¦ ! ¦ ! ¦ ! ¦ ! ² !
J
1 0 0 0 1 1
¤ ! ¦ ! ¦ ! ¦ ! ² ! ² ! ² !
J
0 0 0 1 1 1
² ! ² ! ¦ ! ¦ ! ² !
J
0 0 1 0 1 1
² ! ² ! ² ! ² !
J
0 0 1 1 0 1
² ! ¦ ! ¦ ! ¦ ! ² !
J
0 1 0 0 1 1
² ! ² ! ² ! ² !
J
0 1 0 1 0 1
² ! ² ! ² ! ² !
J
































the communication phase starts in the p column that player 1 has chosen randomly. Hence,
the states used to process the signal are located in a submatrix with 2k rows and a number of
columns which depends on n and ².
Finally, we note that the conditions to ¯nd out player 1's bounds come from
² jRi(!(²))¡ xij < ":
39² The relationship between the number of reused states and the number of states with












With the ¯rst and the second condition we obtain a bound on k with respect to T and " by
counting the number of action pairs played when the game is repeated until T and the maximal
number of reused states: Then, with the last condition we obtain the upper bound of player 1's
complexity.
6.4 Equilibrium conditions:
We check here that the constructed strategies are indeed an equilibrium. We show ¯rst that
any pro¯table deviation by player 1 cannot be implemented by a ¯nite automata of complexity
m1: We study the complexity of a strategy of player 1 which yields a higher payo® when





T : Secondly, we show that with
a probability close to 1 there is no pro¯table deviation from player 2.





T : Then, !t(¾;¿²) =
!(²) for any t ￿ T
z where z is a ¯xed number that depends on the action pair (1,1), with payo®s







T where C depends on the game G.





T and such that ¾ is
implemented by an automaton of size m1.
In order to characterize the size of the automaton which implements a pro¯table deviation,





























To study the complexity of ¾ we must know the one of !(²) for every ² 2 Q, hence we
analyze the complexity of every set of the partition of Q. De¯ne Q1 = f!(¾;¿²) : ² 2 Q(1;¾)g;
40Q2 = f!(¾;¿²) : ² 2 Q(2;¾)g; and Q3 = f!(¾;¿²) : ² 2 Q(3;¾)g: Notice that comp1(Q2) ¸
l1jQ(2;¾)j by lemma 10.


























































T jQ(1;¾)j ¸ jQ(3;¾)j and for T large enough jQ(1;¾)j ¸ 2jQ(3;¾)j












comp1(¾) ¸ (L¡ 1)l1jQ(1;¾)j + l1jQ(2;¾)j
Proof:
By the de¯nition of complexity, comp1(¾) = comp1f!(¾;¿²) : ² 2 Qg ¸
comp1f!(¾;¿²) : ² 2 Q(1;¾) [Q(2;¾)g = comp1(Q1)+ comp1(Q2):
Notice that comp1(Q2) ¸ l1jQ(2;¾)j by lemma 10. Let us bound the complexity of Q1:
By the de¯nition of Q(1;¾), for every ² 2 Q(1;¾), r1
T(¾;¿²) > R1(!(²)): Therefore there
exists a deviation from the proposed play at the end of the game i.e., for every t ￿ 4k + Ll;
!t(¾;¿²) = !t(²): Now by lemma 4, a deviation takes place after 4k + Ll. By the de¯nition
of complexity with ¯nite automata it su±ces to prove that for every pair (²;t); (²0;t0) with
(²;t) 6= (²0;t0) and t ¸ t0 in
Q(1;¾)£f4k+jc¤j;:::;4k+l¡1;4k+jc¤j+l¡1;:::;4k+2l¡1;4k+jc¤j+2l;:::;4k+(L¡1)l¡1g









First, we study the coordinated plays. The play (!4k+1+jc¤j(²);:::;!4k+l+d3(²)) is a coordi-
nated play with the ¯rst d0 ¡ k and the last d3 actions pairs being (0;0) and !0k+l(²) = (1;1).
As d3 > 2k, the string (1;1) + d3 ¤ (0;0) only appears at the end of the play and then if
4k + jc¤j ￿ t0 < t < 4k +l;
(!t+1(²);::;!4k+l(²)) 6= (!1(²0);::;!t0+4k+l¡t0(²¶ ))
and
(¾ j !t+1(²);::;!4k+l(²)) 6= (¾ j !1(²0);::;!t0+s(² ¶ )) because each one of these two plays is a
coordinated play.
We just consider the case where t 6= t(modl). Notice that the play c¤ is independent of
the signal ²: Moreover (!4k+jc¤j+l+1(²);::;!4k+2l(²)) is a coordinated play. Then, if t = t0mod(l)
and ² 6= ²0
(!t(²);::;!t+l(²)) 6= (!t0(²0);::;!t0+l(² ¶ ))
Let s be the largest positive integer such that
(!t(²);::;!t+s(²)) 6= (!t0(²0);::;!t0+s(²¶ ))
then, it follows that !1
t+s(²) 6= !1
t0+s(² ¶ ).
Suppose now that t > t0; t = t0 mod (l) and ² 2 Q(1;¾):








T ) s < T ¡ t and ¾(!t(²);:::;!t+s(²)) 6= ¾(!t0(²0);:::;!t0+s(²0):
¤















Consider the partition of Q = Q(1;¾) [Q(2;¾)[Q(3;¾):
First, if jQ(3;¾)j = ; then jQj = jQ(1;¾)j + jQ(2;¾)j: By the above lemma the complexity
of ¾ is greater than or equal to 3l1jQ(1;¾)j + ljQ(2;¾)j:














m1 ¸ m1 ¡ 2l1+ (L¡ 2)l1jQ(1;¾)j , jQ(1;¾)j = ;






Next, if jQ(3;¾)j 6= ;; as already noted, we can assume that for T large enough jQ(1;¾)j ¸
2jQ(3;¾)j. Then,
m1 ¸ (L¡1)l1jQ(1;¾)j + l1jQ(2;¾)j = l1
2jQ(1;¾)j +
(2L¡1)l1
2 jQ(1;¾)j + l1jQ(2;¾)j > l1jQj+
(2L¡3)l1
2 l1jQ(1;¾)j > m1, which is a contradiction. ¤





Let ¿ be a pure strategy of player 2 such that for some ² 2 Q, !t(¾¤;¿) = !t(²) for every
1 ￿ t ￿ 2k and r2(¾¤;¿) ¸ r2(¾;¿²).
Let s0 be the smallest integer such that 2k < s0 ￿ T with !s(¾¤;¿) 6= !s0(²) and !t(¾¤;¿) =
!t(²) for 1 < t < s0.
If !t(²) = (1;1); player 1 punishes immediately forever, since when player 1 plays the action
1 he uses states which do not tolerate both actions. Recall that r2(1;1) ¸ u2(G) + 2": Then
player 2 will lose about 2"(¸1 ¡ "2)l. Then r2
T(¾¤;¿) ￿ r2
T(¾¤;¿¤):
If !t(²) = (1;1) then t ￿ T ¡ ¸1l=3 and with a probability close to one player1 punishes in
the next d0 ¡ 2k ¡ 1 stages. Then, r2
T(¾¤;¿) ￿ r2
T(¾¤;¿¤):
If !t(²) = (0;1) then player 2 deviates in c¤ and with a probability close to one player 1
punishes in the next d0 ¡ 2k ¡ 1 stages. Then r2
T(¾¤;¿) ￿ r2
T(¾¤;¿¤):
43Finally if player 2 deviates in the communication phase, i.e.: if (!2
1(¾¤;¿);:::;!2
2k(¾¤;¿)) is
not in Q, then with a probability of at least 1
2 player 1 will detect the deviation in one of the
next 5k stages.
Therefore ¿¤ is a best reply against ¾¤. ¤
We ¯nish by giving some details of the above equilibrium construction for the remaining
cases: when the payo® x is obtained by three di®erent actions of player 2 and two of player 1
(the other subcase of case 2) and when it is obtained by three di®erent actions of both players
(case 3).
Subcase 2.2: Assume that a1
1 = a1
2 6= a1
3, and that a2
1 6= a2
2 6= a2






2 by 1 and a2
3 by 2;and assume that x = ¸0r(0;0) + ¸1r(0;1) + ¸2r(1;2), with
¸i > 0, i = 0;1;2 and where
P2
i=0¸i = 1:
Here the communication phase entails using the action pairs (0;0) and (0;2); while those
of the veri¯cation play are (0;0) and (1;2), where the ¯rst one is played whenever player 2
sends a 0 in the communication phase and the second whenever he sends the action 2. By the





Subcase 3.1: Assume that a1
1 6= a1
2 6= a1
3, and that a2
1 = a2
2 6= a2




3 by 0; a1
2 and a2
2 by 1 and a1
3 by 2; and assume that x =
¸0r(0;0)+ ¸1r(1;1) + ¸2r(2;0), with ¸i > 0, i = 0;1;2 and where
P2
i=0¸i = 1:
Now the communication phase consists of the action pairs (0;0) and (0;1); while the pairs
(0;0) and (1;1) are for the veri¯cation play, where the ¯rst one is played whenever player 2
sends a 0 in the communication phase and the second whenever he sends the action 1.
Subcase 3.2: Finally, assume that a1
1 6= a1
2 6= a1
3, and that a2
1 = a2
2 = a2
3 and denote a1
1 and a2
1
and by 0; a1
2 and a2
2 by 1 and a1
3 anda2
3 by 2; and assume that x = ¸0r(0;0)+¸1r(1;1)+¸2r(2;2),
with ¸i > 0, i = 0;1;2 and where
P2
i=0¸i = 1:
The communication phase consists now of the action pairs (0;0), (0;1) and (0;2) while the
veri¯cation play of the pairs (0;0), (1;1) and (2;2). Here the veri¯cation set is bigger since the
cardinality of the veri¯cation sequences' alphabet is three.
447 CONCLUDING REMARKS
We conclude by summarizing the main features of our construction. Let GT(m1;m2) be the
¯nite repetition played by ¯nite automata of the two-player game in strategic form G =





a 2 A, where
P
a2A¸a = 1; and ¸a > 0.
The equilibrium play to achieve x as the equilibrium outcome follows a communication
phase and a speci¯c cycle of action pairs play which depends on this communication phase,
and whose frequencies are approximately ¸a. The cycle play consists of two parts. One is
independent of the communication, the regular play where the payo® x is obtained, while the
other, the veri¯cation play, is uniquely determined by the message sent in the communication
phase. Each part of the cycle play is codi¯ed taking into account that the action pairs in the
regular play have increasing payo®s for the stronger player, which precludes his deviations as
the cycle goes on. In order to keep the distortion from x as small as possible, i.e. " small, the
action pairs used in the veri¯cation play should be also used in the regular play (although, this
is not always possible). Finally the communication scheme is designed such that the sender
player uses di®erent actions to this end while the receiver uses just one action.
The above features establish the codi¯cation alphabet for the equilibrium play. Also the
communication and veri¯cation sequences satisfy an entropy condition to ensure a ¯xed com-
plexity. In particular, e±cient veri¯cation to ¯ll up the weaker player's complexity, translates
to sequences of maximal entropy, since the number of veri¯cation sequences determines this
player's complexity.
The construction of the equilibrium play can be understood as a codi¯cation problem where
what is being codi¯ed is the game parameters: the complexity of the weaker player and the
targeted payo® x. The inter-play communication phenomenon allows to connect the notion of
automaton complexity with that of communication entropy.
Finally, notice that when the players' automata have the same number of states, i.e. m1 =
m2, the above construction remains the same: players could °ip up a coin to decide the one
who undertakes the communication. Alternatively, other constructions with the °avor of the
one presented above could be designed. For instance, players could both send a message in the
communication phase, follow a regular play and then verify through the following construction.
Let Q and Q0 be the communication set of messages of players 1 and 2, respectively. Recall
that Q and Q0 are subsets of TPk¡1( k¡2
2k¡2 , k






> 2k and let c be an element of the following typical set TPk0¡1( k0¡2
2k0¡2 , k0
2k0¡2)£f1g:
Let a 2 Q be a message of Player 1 and consider a biyective map a £ TPk¡1 ! TPk0¡1: The
veri¯cation consists of a subset of TPk0¡1 via the above biyective mapping, denoted by (±), such
that each sequence c = a±b, for a given message b of Player 2. Notice that both players' signals
are balanced and the sequence used in the veri¯cation phase is balanced as well. The length of
the communication is two times the one in the asymmetric case, while that of the veri¯cation
play is about the same than in the previous case. Nevertheless, the number of possible plays
does not vary. With this new construction the rate of distortion, "; is about the same than
above. Notice that here, the number of players' messages has to be the same to ¯ll up the their
automata capacity, and that each player's pure strategy consists of a part related with it signal
(sent in the communication phase) and of a second part related with all possible messages of
the other player.
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